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1. Introduction 
 In 2014, China’s corporate bond market became the first in the world in term of 
issuance volume as a percentage of GDP.2 In the meantime, Chinese governance standards 
remain radically different than those in Western economies (Morck and Yeung, 2014)The 
objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of Chinese firms’ specific ownership features 
on the value added by a bond offering. This question is of prime interest in appraising China’s 
rapidly expanding bond market. It is also of key interest for the development of corporate 
bond market in emerging economies in general, as governance and ownership patterns present 
in China are shared with the majority of emerging countries (Young et al. (2008)). 
One of the most salient features of Chinese companies is state ownership with the state 
(central, or local government) being often the main shareholder in Chinese firms. Such 
ownership can exert an impact on the way the proceedings of the bonds are used by the 
management. On the one hand, it can result in inefficient, politically driven investment 
projects (Chen et al., 2011b). In that case, the bond issue may not enhance shareholders’ 
value. On the other hand, debt issued by a state-owned firm is implicitly guaranteed by the 
state. This assumption is supported by recent statements from the Chinese planning agency 
(Reuters, 2015). Furthermore, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have access to a special type of 
bonds, enterprise bonds. These bonds are used to fund national projects and are strongly 
backed by the government. Privileged access to investment projects and a state guarantee may 
therefore yield positive value for shareholders. Thus, the ultimate impact of a bond issue of a 
state-owned firm on the firm value remains uncertain.  
Chinese listed firms are further characterized by strong ownership concentration and 
management shareholding (Gul, Kim and Qiu, 2010), both defined as insider ownership. 
These features may effectively reduce agency conflicts between insiders and shareholders by 
aligning their interests. However, it may also threaten minority shareholders with 
expropriation (La Porta et al., 2002). The majority shareholder or the management may 
expropriate proceeds from the bond issue and “tunnel” the funds out of the firm (Friedman, 
Johnson, and Mitton, 2003). Nevertheless this effect depends on the level of insider 
shareholding. At a low level of ownership, insiders may not be able to expropriate outsiders, 
whereas at high level of ownership, they may not be willing to decrease the firm value. Again, 
the ultimate impact of insider ownership on the valuation of a bond offering by outsider 
shareholders is uncertain. 
                                                          
2 Source: Global Financial Development Database 2016. The ranking excludes small countries with population 
less than 1 million. 
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We investigate the valuation effect of a bond issue with an event-study methodology. 
Using data on 481 bond issues of 347 issuers from 2009 to 2013, we measure the change in 
shareholders’ value following a bond offering. We then examine if this change is due to state 
ownership, ownership concentration or management ownership. 
We therefore provide a twofold contribution to the literature. First, we contribute to the 
burgeoning literature on Chinese corporate bond market by documenting the impact of a bond 
offering on the firm value. Pessarossi and Weill (2013) have examined the determinants of the 
choice between corporate bonds and syndicated loans, while Lin and Milhaupt (2016) use a 
network perspective to explore this market. Liu et al. (2016) have analyzed the stock market 
reaction following seasoned offerings including convertible bonds. Our work helps 
understanding the valuation effects of bond issues in China.  
Second, we add an investigation to the wide literature on the influence of ownership 
structure of firms in China. A large bunch of studies have shown the influence of ownership 
on financing and investment decisions in China (e.g., Chen et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2011b; 
Fan, Huang and Zhu, 2013). We extend this literature by analyzing how ownership can affect 
the value created by a bond offering. We show how state-ownership exerts an impact on the 
firm value and distinguish among a positive effect generated by a state-guarantee of the bond 
and a negative effect due to politically-driven investments. We also demonstrate that the value 
created by a bond offering depend on the alignment of insiders and outsiders’ interests. These 
results are of prime interest for the development of bond market in China and emerging 
economies in general.3 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background 
of the research question. Section 3 presents our hypotheses. Section 4 documents data and 
methodology. The results are reported in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
The following brief overview describes the main characteristics of Chinese bond 
markets and Chinese firm’s ownership characteristics. 
 
2.1 Bond markets in China 
                                                          
3 See Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2007) for a review. 
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Chinese bond markets emerged in the 1980s. The 1990s saw an expansion in bond 
issues, but bond defaults were common due to poor financial reporting and governance 
mechanisms. After the government bailed out a number of large state companies, it 
implemented stricter rules on bond market access through the National Development Reform 
Commission (NDRC). The government required that any corporate bond issue first needed 
NDRC clearance and set annual quotas on bond issues.  It mandated that every issue be 
guaranteed in full and limited the use of money from a bond issue to fixed asset investment. 
The tough rules chilled China’s bond market. Those left issuing bonds were largely state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) – the very firms most likely to get bailed out or otherwise benefit 
from state favoritism. 
The 2004 document “Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, 
Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets” stressed the need to better develop the bond 
market in order to provide companies with access to large-scale debt financing. In 2007, the 
issuance approbation process was divided between the NDRC and the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The CSRC lifted several impediments to bond market 
development: annual quotas were eliminated, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) 
relinquished control of coupons, bank guarantees were no longer compulsory, and proceeds 
raised could be used for any reasonable purpose. 
More recently, the PBoC has been preparing for the rollout of a market-based interest-
rate scheme in anticipation of liberalized market-based interest-rate formation and the 
introduction of benchmark interest rates for policy guidance (PBoC, 2013). KPMG expects 
bond market growth to accelerate and increase its influence in the financial sector in coming 
years (KPMG, 2014). 
These recent government measures have clearly helped boost the size of the corporate 
bond market, which reached a valuation of nearly $150 billion in 2013. Chinese companies 
today are the largest issuers of private bonds through private placement (Çelik, Demirtaş and 
Isaksson, 2015). The share of SOEs among issuers, despite NDRC favoritism, decreased from 
70% in 2007 to 48% in 2009 (Chen, Mazumdar and Surana, 2011). 
 
2.2. Ownership of Chinese Firms 
 Chinese firms are characterized by high levels of state-ownership, management 
ownership and ownership concentration.  
 State-ownership is widespread in China. According to Tian and Estrin (2008), in the 
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early 2000s, the state was the largest shareholder in 43.9% of Chinese companies. In 31.4% of 
the Chinese firms, the state detains more than 50% of the shares. These figures only account 
for direct ownership and Peng, Wei and Yang (2011) note that 80% of listed companies are 
SOEs and 70% of shares are held directly or indirectly by the state. State-ownership can be 
divided between central and local state-ownership. While central SOEs are directly owned by 
the central state and encompass among the biggest companies in the country, local SOEs are 
either hold by a region or a city.  
 Classification in terms of ownership can be related to firm performance. Chen, Firth, 
and Xu (2009) show that efficiency varies between privately-owned firms, central SOEs and 
local SOEs with central SOEs performing the best and privately controlled firms performing 
the worst. A quite recent development in state-ownership was the 2005 non-tradable shares 
reform which render public SOEs capital freely negotiable (see for instance Liu and Tian 
(2012). The trend toward privatization remains however progressive in China (Liao, Liu, and 
Wang, 2014). 
 A second common characteristic of Chinese firms is a highly concentrated 
shareholding. Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) highlight the fact that the state, business 
conglomerates or funding families hold most of the shares in listed firms. Indeed, not only do 
most listed firms possess a pyramidal structure, but Xiao and Zhao (2014) point out that 90% 
of all privately owned firms have pyramidal ownership structures. 
Last, Chinese firms are characterized by high levels of management ownership (Chen et 
al., 2011a). As in other emerging countries, concentrated ownership usually leads to 
concentrated management ownership, the main owner being the CEO or an influential board 
member. Family companies also often appoint family members to the board, resulting in high 
management shareholdings   
 
3. Hypotheses 
In this section, we present some hypotheses on the value added by a bond offering for 
shareholders of Chinese firms. We start with hypotheses on the overall stock market reaction. 
We then focus on three characteristics of ownership in China: state ownership, concentration 
of ownership in the hands of the first shareholder, and management ownership. 
 
3.1 Stock market reaction 
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Two competing hypotheses explain the reaction of stock market investors following the 
issue of a corporate bond. 
In the first hypothesis, a bond issue generates a positive stock market reaction for two 
reasons. First, it provides a positive signal that helps solve adverse selection from information 
asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders. High quality firms use debt issues, including 
bonds, to demonstrate their creditworthiness and low probability of default. Second, it reduces 
moral hazard behavior of managers, thereby helping lower agency costs from conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and managers. Debt financing puts pressure on managers to 
perform by restricting the amount of free cash flows at their disposal (Jensen, 1986). Greater 
debt means higher interest payment obligations and a greater probability of default if these 
obligations are not satisfied, so there is incentive for managers perform well and avoid 
bankruptcy. 
Under the second hypothesis, in contrast, a decision to issue a bond leads to a negative 
stock market reaction for three reasons, which are all linked to higher debt loading. First, 
issuing a bond implies higher agency costs between shareholders and debtholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Hence, it increases the cost of the debt for shareholders. 
Second, the issuance of new debt increases the firm’s exposure to bankruptcy costs, which 
reduces the stock valuation of the company. Finally, issuance of a bond provides management 
with a large amount of cash that can be inefficiently invested if robust governance 
mechanisms are not in place (Myers, 2000). 
Empirically, shareholder reactions to a bond issue show no distinct pattern and seem to 
depend on which effect dominates. Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986), and Eckbo (1986) find a negative but insignificant reaction, Chang et al. (2006) and 
Cai and Lee (2013) found a negative and significant reaction, while Miller and 
Puthenpurackal (2005), Chang et al. (2006) and Fungacova, Godlewski and Weill (2015) 
provide evidence of a positive valuation effect. We conclude from the empirical literature that 
no consensual finding has emerged for the stock market reaction following a bond issue. The 
reaction is governed by characteristics of the firm and the country where the issuance occurs. 
No study we are aware of has investigated stock market reactions following Chinese 
bond issues, so we can offer no similar former studies to draw upon when tackling this 
particular question. We expect that stock market reactions should be positive in China because 
of the pronounced signaling role of bond issues. Here, four aspects of this signaling deserve 
mention. 
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First, constraints in the banking industry and the scarcity of bond financing means that 
most Chinese firms suffer from a lack of access to loan funding (Cousin, 2011). Firms that are 
able to tap into the bond market are demonstrating access to large-scale funding. 
Second, bond financing sends a positive signal of regulatory approval. To secure a bond 
issue, the regulator requires the firm to submit to a strict administrative vetting, including a 
proof of three consecutive years of profitability prior to the bond issue. Thus, a bond issue is a 
regulatory acknowledgement that the issuer enjoys a degree of financial health. 
Finally, bond market access tells something about the political relationships of firm 
managers. Liu and Tian (2010) demonstrate that political relationships play an important role 
in debt funding in China. Chen et al. (2011a) further observe that these relationships enable 
firms to extract rents and promote their investments. Hence, issuing a bond is a positive signal 
that the firm enjoys beneficial political relationships. 
 
3.2 The influence of state ownership 
The role of state ownership on the value created by a bond issue is uncertain. On the 
negative side, the fact of state ownership in itself may be sufficient to provoke a negative 
stock market reaction. Shirley and Walsh (2001), for example, have shown the lack of 
managerial incentives and harmful effects of political interference in state-owned firms. Wang 
and Judge (2010) also note that political objectives in China may prevent management from 
pursuing profit maximization strategies. Overall, state ownership seems to decrease firm 
efficiency and depress the value of Chinese companies (e.g. Tian and Estrin, 2008; Chen et 
al., 2011b). 
On the positive side, SOEs enjoy preferential access to a specific type of bonds, 
enterprise bonds. Enterprise bonds are used to fund nation-wide investment projects, 
supported by the government.  They are larger, more liquid and guaranteed by the state. 
Consequently, they provide large amounts of funds at low cost to shareholders. The National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has recently confirmed that the state will not 
let any bond issued by a SOE default (Reuters, 2015).4 This feature should reduce the cost of 
funding for the firm and favor a positive stock market reaction.  
We consider separately firms owned by the central government and those owned by 
local or provincial governments. Even if both types of firms are majority-owned by the state, 
differences could stem factors such as proximity to financial hubs or political connections. 
                                                          
4 There is no default for a bond issued by a SOE during the period of our study (2009-2013) in our sample. 
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The state may have greater incentives to protect central SOEs, because they can have an 
impact on the whole country and because the management has tighter relationship with the 
central power.  
However empirical evidence has found that, even if state ownership may initially hurts a 
firm’s valuation, the relation between state shareholding and firm value tends to be nonlinear, 
following a U-curve (Tian and Estrin, 2008). Under this view, a small government stake is 
off-putting to shareholders as it is seen as encouraging inefficient investment and wealth 
expropriation. A large government stake, in contrast, is seen as assuring safe investment 
opportunities, political subsidies, and easy access to funding (Pessarossi and Weill, 2013). 
To investigate the impact of state as main shareholder, we use a dummy for SOEs. A 
value of one is assigned if the firm is owned by the state and a value of zero otherwise (SOE). 
We also use two dummy variables for central SOEs and local SOE. Central SOE gets a value 
of one if the firm is owned by the central state. Local SOE takes a value of one if a local 
government or province owns the firm. We follow the method of Pessarossi and Weill (2013) 
and use CSI thematic indexes to distinguish among SOEs (Central SOE or Local SOE).5 
To investigate the impact of state shareholding, we use the percentage of shares owned 
by the state (Government Stake) and its quadratic term.  
 
3.3 The role of ownership concentration 
High ownership concentration of Chinese listed companies can influence the value 
created by a bond offering. Greater ownership concentration could favor firm value by 
fostering shareholder monitoring of firm managers. This also diminishes any free-riding 
problems that could impair shareholder control of managers. 
However, La Porta et al. (2000) note that the influence of ownership concentration tends 
to evolve along with investor protections. In countries with weak investor protection, 
ownership concentration is likely to pose a threat to minority shareholders of abuse or 
expropriation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) find that corporate 
governance in China is significantly lower than most of the countries in La Porta et al. (1998) 
sample. Hence, there is an important risk of expropriation of bonds’ proceeds by insiders in 
China.  Specifically, when a main shareholder gains access to a large amount of cash (as when 
raised by a bond issue), minority shareholders are likely to suffer if the main shareholder 
                                                          
5 www.csindex.com.cn 
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“tunnels” the proceeds out of the firm (Johnson et al., 2000; Faccio, Lang and Young, 2009; 
Fong and Lam, 2014). 
We expect an N-shaped relation between the shares hold by the main shareholder and 
stock market reaction after the bond issuance. With a small stake in the firm, it is difficult for 
the main shareholder to divert and appropriate company assets. Thus, the main shareholder 
must also aim at increasing firm value, thereby fully aligning his interests with other 
shareholders. With an increasing stake, the main shareholder’s incentive to tunnel out the 
proceeds of the bond issue for private gains at the expense of minority shareholders increase 
only to a certain threshold. Above this threshold of ownership, the majority shareholder’s 
interests again align with those of the minority shareholders. Indeed, a top shareholder’s 
incentive for diverting firm value for private gain becomes counterproductive as it results in 
personal loss. At this point, Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) show that the bond issue 
signals an implicit commitment from top shareholder to prop up the firm and not to tunnel out 
the proceeds. 
To investigate the effect of main shareholding, we use the percentage of shares owned 
by the top shareholder (Top Shareholder) and also include the quadratic and cubic terms. We 
only compute Top Shareholder for private firms, since it corresponds to Government Share 
for SOEs. 
We also consider ownership concentration with the Herfindahl index from the first to 
twentieth shareholder of the firm (Herfindahl Ownership). Other influential shareholders can 
mitigate the power of the top shareholder. Following Bai et al. (2004), they can prevent 
tunneling, closely monitor the management and facilitate takeovers in the case of poor 
performance. Thus, we expect that dispersed shareholding contributes to a positive stock 
market reaction to a bond issue because it mitigates the hampering behavior of a controlling 
shareholder. 
 
3.4 The influence of management ownership 
We consider the potential impact of management ownership on the value created by a 
bond issue. Management ownership is an effective way to resolve principal-agent conflicts by 
aligning management and shareholders incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but it still 
suffers from the same drawbacks as concentrated ownership. Management shareholders, who 
by their position are authorized to make financial decisions, can also tunnel resources out of 
the firm.  
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Thus, following the seminal work of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and its 
extension by Davies, Hillier and McColgan (2005) and Ruan, Tian and Ma (2011), we assume 
a non-linear N-relationship between management ownership and the stock market’s reaction 
to a bond issue.  
As a general observation, a stake in the firm should provide a manager with an incentive 
to maximize value. Hence we expect an initially positive shareholder reaction to management 
shareholding. However, a high stake of management in the firm contributes to managerial 
entrenchment. Entrenched managers are better positioned than others for tunneling resources 
out of the firm for their private benefit. They can misuse the proceeds of a bond issue for their 
own sake and destroy shareholder value. As a consequence, we expect a negative relation 
between shareholder reaction and management shareholding above a low threshold. Above a 
higher threshold, the interests of managers realign with shareholder interests. Private gains 
they would benefit from tunneling or misusing resources become inferior to the benefits they 
obtain by maximizing firm value. The relation between shareholders’ reaction and 
management shareholders is thus expected to be positive for high degree of management 
ownership.  
To investigate this non-linear relation, we use the percentage of shares hold by 
managers (Management Stake) and its quadratic and cubic terms. We use the Bloomberg data 
on shares held by the management.  
 
4. Data and methodology 
The following discussion presents the data and describes the methodology used to 
compute abnormal returns. 
 
4.1 Data 
Our data on bond issues and issuers are taken from the Bloomberg Professional Server. 
We select issues during the period 2009–2013 to avoid the 2007 non-trading shares reform 
and the harshest impacts of the global financial crisis. We also exclude financial sector bond 
issues, and further restrict the sample to issues with original maturities over a year. The 
limitations allow us to focus on whether the issue significantly impacts shareholder perception 
of the firm’s financial prospects. We focus on straight bonds, excluding convertible bond 
issues. For stock markets, we consider only A-shares listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen 
stock exchanges. 
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The resulting sample encompasses 481 issues of 347 issuers. We distinguish between 
SOEs and privately owned enterprises (POEs). As explained above, we used the CSI thematic 
index composition to classify a firm as state or privately owned. We adopt this classification 
since the ultimate owner of a firm can be impossible to identify in China, due to pyramidal 
ownership. However few firms cannot be classified and are dropped from the sample. Table 1 
displays the distribution of issues by year, industry, and type of firm. We observe an increase 
in bond issues over the period. SOEs represent the majority of issuers, even if issues by 
private firms increase over time.  
Table 2 presents the main statistics for the issue variables. For the full sample, the 
average maturity is around 5 years, spanning from 2 to 13 years. Notably, some part of over 
69% of the sample issues went to debt payment. The share of proceeds used to finance 
investment projects was relatively small; 77% of issues were dedicated to working capital 
funding. Overall, issues seem mostly to provide a large pot of cash for management rather 
than going to finance specific capital expenditures. 
We explore the role of state ownership in China by comparing the issues made by SOEs 
and private firms. Most bonds’ features are different between both groups. The bonds issued 
by SOEs are more than twice larger, with a longer maturity. They also pay a lower coupon, 
while they have the same (mandatory) issue price. Last, SOE bonds are less used to fund 
working capital and have fewer restrictive covenants. Overall, bonds issued by SOEs seem to 
be more trusted by investors and less costly for shareholders. 
Table 3 displays the main statistics for the issuer variables. We observe a high 
profitability of firms with a mean EBITDA to assets greater than 7%.  Again, we divide the 
sample between private and state-owned firms. We observe significant differences between 
both groups of firms. SOEs are larger, either in term of assets or sales. They have a better 
access to the debt, with a higher debt ratio, whereas their current ratio is lower. However, 
SOEs do not have higher profitability than private firms, which can be explained by the fact 
that all firms should be profitable to be allowed to access the bond market. Concerning 
ownership, private firms have higher management shareholding and more concentrated 
ownership with a higher Herfindahl Index. Last, private firms display high level of top 
shareholding, with a mean above 20% and a maximum reaching 73%.  
 
4.2 Methodology 
We use a standard event-study methodology to measure the stock market reaction to 
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bond issues6. We compute the abnormal return (AR) around the announcement date.7 We use 
a market model for the expected return with the return of the stock defined as: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡,        (1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return of the share price of company i on day t. Returns are computed 
as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
  with 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 the closing price of the share i on day t. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return. 
 We use the CSI A300 index, which is based on the A-shares of the 300 largest 
companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. This index provides a broad 
view of market return on Chinese A-shares. It is also consistent with our sample; i.e. firms 
that issue bonds tend to be large firms. 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 and 𝛽𝑖,𝑡 are parameters to be estimated through the 
OLS regression. We use an estimation period of 110 working days from 130 days to 21 days 
before the issue.8 Ultimately, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 consists in the abnormal return over the estimation period, 
with 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 𝜎𝑖
2. 
Thereafter, we compute the abnormal return around the event date: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼?̂? +  𝛽?̂?. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡) .     (2) 
We then compute the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) over several windows from 
two days before the event to two days after. We use three symmetric windows ([0,0], [-1,-1], 
and [-2,-2]) and two asymmetric windows ([-2,1] and [-1,2]). We also use a wider window 
from five days before the announcement to five days after ([-5,5]). We compute the CAR for 
each window: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏
𝜏2
𝜏=𝜏1
 ,        (3) 
where 𝜏1 is the first day of the window and 𝜏2 the last day. We then compute the average 
CAR across companies: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1, 𝜏2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2)
𝑁
𝑖=1  .       (4) 
To test the significance of abnormal returns, we follow two complementary approaches 
to control for event-induced variance. First, we compute a cross-sectional statistic considering 
only the variance within the event. This involves dividing the average CAR by its cross-
                                                          
6 See e.g. MacKinlay (1997) for a review.  
7 We use the announcement date to study the corporate bond issuance in line with former literature (e.g., Liu et 
al., 2016). Eckbo (1986) has shown that the announcement date is the most appropriate date for such studies 
since it is the definitive date. 
8 We only keep companies with 80% of trading days over the estimation period so that we have only companies 
with liquid stocks in the sample. To test liquidity, we have only performed estimations including a liquidity 
measure, the proportion of zero return days over the year before the bond issuance following Bekaert, Harvey 
and Lundblad (2007). We observe that the main findings remain unchanged. 
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sectional standard deviation over the observation period: 
𝜃(𝜏1,𝜏2)
𝐶𝑆 =  
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1,𝜏2)
√[
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2)−𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1,𝜏2))]²
𝑁
𝑖=1
 .     (5) 
We next compute Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen’s standardized cross-sectional 
statistic (Boehmer, Masumeci and Poulsen, 1991) which combines variance over the 
estimation period and within the event period. We first obtain the variance of abnormal 
returns over the estimation period: 
𝜎𝑖
2(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = (𝜏2 − 𝜏1 + 1). 𝜎𝑖,𝐴𝑅𝑒
2  .       (6) 
With 𝐴𝑅𝑒 the abnormal return over the estimation period, the CAR of each company is 
standardized by the standard deviation of abnormal returns over the estimation period. This 
provides the standardized cumulated abnormal return (SCAR): 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2)
√(𝜏2−𝜏1+1).𝜎𝑖,𝐴𝑅𝑒
2
  .       (7) 
The standardized cross-sectional statistic is then obtained by dividing the cross-sectional 
average SCAR over its cross-sectional standard deviation during the event period: 
𝜃(𝜏1,𝜏2)
𝐵𝑀𝑃 =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
√[
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2)−
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1,𝜏2)
𝑁
𝑖=1 )]²
𝑁
𝑖=1
 .    (8) 
Finally, we perform a sign test on the median to test if the results are not led by a 
skewed distribution. 
Having computed our CARs, the second part of the analysis considers CAR 
determinants. Here, we perform OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at the issuer 
level. Our dependent variable is the CAR computed on a [-1,1] event window. 
In addition to tested determinants on ownership, we include control variables to take 
into account characteristics of issuance and issuer. We consider three issuance characteristics: 
the logarithm of Amount Issued, the logarithm of Maturity and the Coupon. We also take into 
account five issuer characteristics: size (log of Sales), market valuation (Market-to-Book), 
leverage (Debt-to-Assets), financial health (Current Ratio), and profitability (Ebitda-to-
Assets). We therefore control notably for profitability and risk of the issuing firm. We include 
dummy variables for years and sectors.9 All variables are described in the Appendix A.1 while 
Appendix A.2 reports the correlations between all variables used in the analysis. 
. 
 
                                                          
9 We also tested the inclusion of monthly dummies and of quarterly dummies in the estimations. Results remain unchanged. 
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5. Results 
We begin this section with the univariate results of the event study for the stock market 
reaction to the announcement of a bond issue. We then provide our multivariate estimations. 
The section ends with a discussion of our robustness checks. 
 
5.1 Univariate results 
Table 4 displays summary statistics for cumulative abnormal returns around bond 
announcements for a variety of event windows. Looking at the full sample, it is clear that 
CARs are positive and significant for all event windows with the exception of [0,0]. Hence, 
the results support a positive stock market reaction to bond announcements in China. This 
conclusion accords with the view that debt is perceived as a positive signal for stock market 
investors. The issue may signal that the firm has access to valuable investment projects and is 
able to secure large-scale funding. In the case of China, a bond issue is especially good news 
because the bonds are implicitly guaranteed by the state, providing the firm with a low cost of 
funding. Moreover, the issue signals that the firm has the political relays necessary to issue a 
bond and to conduct investments using these relations.  
Second, this positive reaction may stem from the positive effect of a bond issue on 
agency costs. As Chinese firms are characterized by a concentrated ownership, a bond issue 
may align the interests of insiders and outsiders and lower the risks of expropriation. 
Our conclusion of a positive stock market reaction can be related to the finding of Liu et 
al. (2016) in their analysis of the impact of seasoned offering issues on market valuation: they 
find a positive stock market reaction following convertible bond offerings. 
 
To estimate the role of state ownership, we next analyze to see if this finding stands for 
all ownership types or whether form of ownership influences stock market reaction. If the role 
of the state, through an implicit guarantee of the bond or political relations, explains the 
positive stock reaction, we should especially observe it for SEOs. Examine CARs for SOEs 
(both central and local) and POE, we find that the CARs are only significantly positive for 
SOEs (and not significant for POE). However, the difference between SOEs and Private firms 
is not significant. We then break down our SOE result by considering separately central SOEs 
and local SOEs. Here, we observe that the stock market reaction is only significantly positive 
for central SOEs (again, the differences between categories are not significant either in mean 
or median).  
15 
 
The finding of a positive stock market reaction only for SOEs can be interpreted with 
three explanations. First, bonds issued by SOEs are of better quality for the valuation of 
companies. The observed differences in the characteristics of bonds issued by SOEs and by 
private firms support the interpretation of the finding. Bonds issued by SOEs are less costly, 
less used for working capital purposes and entail less restrictive covenants for shareholders. A 
second explanation is the use of the proceeds.  Because the bonds issued by SOEs benefit 
from a political support and are used for state investments, they are more likely to be 
profitable for shareholders. Last, SOEs shareholders are not exposed to the default of the 
bond. Because there is an explicit guarantee of SOEs bonds by the state, the probability of 
default is quasi null. Hence, a bond issue is a risk-free funding for a SOE and its shareholders.  
The result that local SOEs do not exhibit such a positive reaction can be explained 
through the comparison of the characteristics of central and local SOEs issues and issuers. In 
this aim, Table 5 provides the comparison of statistics for both groups of SOEs. We observe 
major differences between both groups. First, issues made by central SOEs are larger, of 
longer maturity, and less costly with a significant lower coupon. Therefore these differences 
in terms of issue quality help explaining the difference in stock market reaction. However, 
unlike private firms, the proceeds of both local and central SOEs are used for similar purposes 
and they do not have different level of restrictive covenants.  
Second, when considering issuers’ features, central SOEs are larger than local SOEs. 
Central SOEs also have a larger government share than local SOEs, which implies that the 
state is more concerned by the former firms. Hence, central SOEs may have access to better 
investment projects and benefit from a stronger state guarantee on their debt. Thus, the 
positive reaction for central SOEs can overall be attributed to issues of better quality as well 
as a higher government stake in the firm, which may provide better investment projects and a 
stronger state guarantee.  
We now turn to the multivariate analysis to isolate the role of issue’s and issuer’s 
features from ownership characteristics.  
 
5.2 Multivariate results 
In our regressions of cumulative abnormal returns, the dependent variable is the 
cumulative abnormal return over the [-1,1] event window. We do this for two reasons. First, 
we want to check if the finding for positive stock market reaction for central SOEs is still 
observed when issue and issuer variables are included. Second, we want to see how ownership 
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and management characteristics influence the stock market reaction following a bond issue. 
To test the hypotheses on state ownership, top shareholding, and management 
ownership, we perform three sets of regressions, which are reported in Tables 6 through 8. In 
each table, the same control variables for issue and issuer characteristics are included. Table 6 
displays estimations on the role of state ownership. Table 7 provides estimations on top 
shareholding and shareholding concentration. Table 8 presents regressions on management 
ownership.  
Table 6 presents five estimations to investigate the role of state ownership. The first and 
second column displays the results alternatively with SOE and Central SOE as the key 
variable so that we can refine our univariate results. We find that SOEs do not exhibit a higher 
stock reaction. However, the stock reaction for central SOEs is significantly different than for 
private firms and local SOEs. This result appears when controlling for issuance and issuer 
features, since we perform a multivariate approach. Hence, it is not the higher quality of 
issues which explains a better stock reaction, but the fact that the issuer is a central SOE. This 
finding supports both the hypotheses of a state guarantee of the bond and an access to more 
valuable investments because of stronger political links. 
We explore further the role of state ownership by using the government stake in the firm 
instead of a dummy variable.10 We test for a linear and a quadratic relationship with stock 
reaction. These estimations are displayed in the third and fourth column of Table 6. We find 
no evidence of a linear relation between the government share in the firm and the stock 
reaction: the variable Government Stake is negative but not significant. However, when 
testing the quadratic relation, we find that Government Stake² turns to be negative and 
significant, whereas Government Stake remains mute. Hence, there is a negative effect of state 
ownership  onlywhen the state detains a large stake of the issuers’ capital.  
This concave relation is in opposition with our hypothesis of a U-shaped relation between 
government share and the stock reaction. However, there are some reasons to believe that this 
relation is not the same for SOEs and private firms. Whereas private firms may benefit from 
high share of state ownership thanks to the opportunities it provides, state-owned firms may 
be harmed by excessive state ownership, because of political and bureaucratic interferences. 
We therefore allow for a different relation between Government Stake and the stock reaction 
between private firms and SOEs by adding an interaction term to our model in the fifth 
                                                          
10 We have also investigated whether Government Stake influences the probability for a company to issue a bond 
with a logit estimation. We do not observe any relationship, suggesting that the percentage of shares held by the 
State does not exert an impact on the probability to issue a bond. 
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column of Table 6. Private×Government Stake and Private×Government Stake² are the 
interaction terms between Private (a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a POE) and 
Government Stake. Both interaction terms inform on the relation between government stake 
and abnormal returns for private firms. Consequently, Government Stake and Government 
Stake² inform on this relation for SOEs, that is when the state is the main shareholder. The 
findings for this latter specification support our hypothesis of a different relation between 
government share and abnormal returns for SOEs and for private firms. Private firms do not 
exhibit a U-shaped relation and the coefficients are not significant. State-ownership does not 
have an effect on the reaction to a bond issue for privately owned firms.  
The absence of significance for control variables support a lack of heterogeneity in 
issuance and financial characteristics, a finding consistent with highly regulated bond markets. 
Because the CRSC only allows profitable firms to tap the bond market and strictly controls 
issuance characteristics, issuance and issuer characteristics do not appear to play a role in 
shareholder reactions. Instead, it is the proximity to the state which gives value to the offering.  
  
Table 7 presents the estimations for the role of top shareholding on stock reaction of 
private firms. The sample only includes private firms, since the last specification of Table 6 
already tests the role of top shareholding when the state is the main shareholder. The first 
column of Table 7 displays the results with Top Shareholder. We then add Top Shareholder² 
in the second column and also Top Shareholder3 in the third column so that we consider a 
nonlinear relation. To take into account ownership concentration, we also include the 
Herfindahl index of shareholding concentration.  
With the linear specification, we do not observe a significant effect of Top Shareholder.  
This conclusion does not change when we account for a non-linear specification. When we 
test for a quadratic relation, both Top Shareholder and Top Shareholder² are not significant. 
Last, when we test for a cubic relation, only Top Shareholder² is significantly negative. 
Overall, there is no evidence of an impact of top shareholding on the stock reaction to a 
bond issue. The only significant coefficient is Top Shareholder2 in the cubic relation. 
However, it falls short providing a sufficient piece of evidence.11 Hence, we conclude that 
ownership concentration in general does not exert an impact on the reaction to a bond issue. A 
specific case of ownership concentration, which is widespread in China, is management 
shareholding. We now turn to this specific issue of Chinese firms. 
                                                          
11 When we define Top Shareholder as the share of the three top shareholders and redo the estimations, the 
results are similar and the coefficients are not significant. 
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Table 8 provides the estimations for management ownership with Management Stake as 
the key variable. We subsequently test a linear, quadratic and cubic relation with 
shareholders’ reaction to the bond issue in the three specifications by considering first only 
Management Stake and then by adding incrementally the squared term and the cubic term. 
We find that Management Stake is not significant in the first specification, while neither 
Management Stake nor Management Stake² are not significant in the second specification. 
However we obtain results confirming our hypothesis with the cubic specification: we observe 
significant coefficients that are positive for Management Stake and Management Stake3, and 
negative for Management Stake2. These results imply the existence of an N-curve for the 
relation between management ownership and stock market reaction in line with our 
hypothesis on tunneling and management ownership. They show that the relation between 
shareholder value and management ownership follows a non-linear relationship as reported by 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) for firm value. The results also support the view that bond 
issues are not necessarily associated with fear of tunneling or propping. Shareholder 
expectations depend on the size of management holdings in the firm.  
Figure 1 draws the marginal effect of Management Stake on the stock reaction. The N-
shaped relationship is observed with 12.07% and 41.84% as turning points (first partial 
derivatives of CAR[-1;1] with respect to Management Stake equals zero). It appears that 
interests of management and shareholders in a bond issue are initially aligned (up to 12% of 
management ownership). Shareholders expect management to use the proceeds of the issue in 
a manner consistent with their own interests. However, as the size of the stake held by 
management expands and cross 12% of the shares, shareholders expect a divergence from 
their own interests. Since bond issues provide large cash flows to management, they fear the 
proceeds may be misused and diverted to non-productive investments or tunneled out the 
firm. Finally, when stake held by management reaches a certain size (exceeds 41%), the 
interests of shareholders and management appear to realign. Above this threshold, an increase 
in the management stake improves the stock reaction. 
The predicted stock reaction in respect with the level of Management Stake becomes 
negative when the management holds between 29.48% and 51.38% of the shares. When 
looking at the sample of firms, we point out that only 5.38% of firms have a management 
stake ranging from 29.48% and 51.38% %. Hence the effect of management shareholding is 
positive for the vast majority of firms.  
To assess the robustness of the cubic specification and the estimated turning points, we 
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follow Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Davies, Hillier and McColgan (2005) and 
perform a spline regression. To that end, we construct the three following variables based on 
the estimated turning points: 
𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 =  {
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 if 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 < 12.07 
12.07 if 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 > 12.07
 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 =  {
0 if 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 < 12.07
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 − 12.07 if 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 > 12.07
41.84 − 12.07 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 > 41.84
 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 =  {
0 if 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 < 41.84 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 − 41.84 if 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 > 41.84
 
 Table 9 reports the results. The coefficients of the spline regression are all significant 
and their signs are consistent with the previous results. Low Insider and High Insider are 
positive and significant, which indicates that low and high-level of insider ownership 
increases the stock-market reaction. Medium Insider is negative and significant, consistent 
with the view that a level of management shareholding between 12.07% and 41.84% provokes 
a negative reaction.  
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
We check the robustness of our results by calculating abnormal returns with alternative 
indexes to compute expected returns. Our finding can be driven by the use of the stock market 
index. Specifically, we compute abnormal returns using CSI sector indexes in the expected 
return calculation. To accomplish this, we perform regressions of the return of each company 
on its sector index, relying on Morgan Stanley’s Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) classification. 
Table 10 provides CARs with the new computations. We again observe a positive stock 
market reaction to bond announcements by SOEs, and more specifically, central SOEs. These 
results corroborate our main findings observed in the main univariate results. 
Table 11 displays regressions with the new CARs. We use the CAR obtained with the [-
1,1] event window as the dependent variable. We test the three main specifications of our 
explanatory variables. We obtain similar results for the role of central state ownership, 
government stake, and management stake.  More precisely, we observe a positive effect of 
Central SOE and a quadratic relation between government share and the abnormal returns. 
We also find evidence of an N-shaped relation between management shareholding and stock 
market reaction. 
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However, we do not observe significant coefficients for the cubic specification of Top 
Shareholder, even if the sign of the estimates are similar. Hence, we qualify our results on the 
role of top shareholding. 
In addition, we have performed the multivariate estimations for the subsamples of 
companies: state-owned companies, central state-owned companies, local state-owned 
companies, and private firms. The idea is to check if our main findings stand for these 
subsamples. Estimations are not presented here for space reasons. 
We observe that the positive and significant coefficient of Central SOE is observed 
when estimations are only performed for the subsample of SOE, which confirms the 
robustness of our finding of a positive impact of central state ownership. We also find that the 
N-shape relation between shareholders’ reaction and management ownership is observed 
when estimations are performed for subsamples of SOE and of private firms. Hence this 
finding supports the fact that the N-shape relation between stock market reaction and 
management ownership is not limited to one type of companies (private or state-owned). 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study examined the impact of bond offerings on Chinese firms’ value. The 
expansion of corporate bond markets in the recent years has given rise to questions regarding 
the use and the impact of bonds as a means for large-scale corporate financing. Using an 
event-study methodology, we investigated how shareholders react to corporate bond issues 
and how much they value a bond offering. Our main findings are summarized below. 
Bond issuance in China favors a positive stock market reaction. This key result supports 
the view that issuing a bond gives a positive signal to Chinese stock markets in line with the 
hypotheses on the signaling role of the bond.  
Ownership structure of the firm is a key determinant of the value created by a bond 
issuance. First, our univariate results suggest that the positive stock market reaction only 
applies to central state-owned companies. Our multivariate analysis shows that central state-
ownership increases the value of the firm when they access the bond market. We reject a 
negative effect of politically-driven investments and attribute this finding to the explicit state 
guarantee of the bonds issued by central SOEs, and the privileged access to investment 
projects.  
We also find evidence of the role of manager ownership with a N-shaped relation 
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between shareholders’ reaction and management ownership. Management ownership 
contributes to an increase in stock value following bond issuance when the management 
ownership is either less than 12% or more than 42% of the company. This result confirms the 
prime role of the alignment of interests between insiders and outsiders in China and the risk of 
expropriation outsiders are potentially facing. 
These findings provide important insights on the role of ownership structure in China. 
Of particular relevance is the finding that investors attach value to state and management 
ownership. It underlines that China specific governance issues, stemming from its political 
organization and economic institutions exert an impact on the corporate bond market. We 
therefore open avenues for further research. Future projects could consider the identity of 
bondholders. Lastly, it would be important to identify political connections at the firm level to 
better understand the reaction. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of sample issues 
This table gives the composition of bond issues in the sample by year and sector (GICS classification). Private 
firms and state-owned enterprises are sorted according to CSI thematic indexes. 
 
 
Total Private Firms State-Owned Enterprises 
   
Year    
2009 7 2 5 
2010 26 4 22 
2011 92 25 67 
2012 198 77 121 
2013 158 54 104 
    
 
  
 Industry   
Consumer discretionary 68 35 33 
Consumer staples 18 12 6 
Energy 25 8 17 
Health 24 18 6 
Industrials 150 34 116 
Info tech 16 12 4 
Materials 139 38 101 
Telecoms 1 1 0 
Utilities 40 4 36 
    
Total 481 162 319 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics: Issues 
This table presents statistics for issues. Amount Issued are in millions of yuan, Coupon in percent, and maturity 
in years. Debt Payment and Working Capital Funding are dummy variables. Debt Payment equals one if the 
proceeds are used to repay debt and zero otherwise. Working Capital Funding gets a value of one if the proceeds 
are used to finance working capital and zero otherwise. Restrictive Covenant is a dummy variable that has a 
value of one if the issue includes covenants that impair shareholder flexibility.  We test the mean and median 
differences between state-owned firms and private firms with a Student t-test and a non-parametric equality-of-
median test respectively. ***, **, and * report the 1%, 5%, and 10% thresholds of significance. 
 
  
 
N Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Full Sample       
Amount issued (M) 481 1574.636 800 2348.489 50 20000 
Coupon 481 5.87 5.71 0.981 0 9.6 
Maturity (years) 481 5.20 5.00 1.663 2.00 12.92 
Debt Payment 481 0.69 1 0.465 0 1 
Working Capital Funding 481 0.77 1 0.419 0 1 
Restrictive Covenant 432 0.81 1 0.389 0 1 
       
SOEs       
Amount issued (M) 319 1944.3*** 1000*** 2748.208 90 20000 
Coupon 319 5.58*** 5.55*** 0.851 0 7.99 
Maturity (years) 319 5.34*** 5*** 1.843 1.998631 12.91764 
Debt Payment 319 0.67 1 0.472 0 1 
Working Capital Funding 319 0.73*** 1 0.443 0 1 
Restrictive Covenant 277 0.78** 1 0.415 0 1 
       
Private firms       
Amount issued (M) 162 846.73*** 600*** 849.638 50 6000 
Coupon 162 6.42*** 6.2*** 0.982 4.2 9.6 
Maturity (years) 162 4.93*** 5*** 1.192 2.997947 8 
Debt Payment 162 0.72 1 0.449 0 1 
Working Capital Funding 162 0.85*** 1 0.356 0 1 
Restrictive Covenant 155 0.88** 1 0.329 0 1 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics: Issuers 
The table presents statistics of issuers. Sales and Total Assets are in millions of yuan. Top Shareholder is the 
percentage owned by the first shareholder of a private firm. We test the mean and median differences between 
state-owned firms and private firms with a Student t-test and a non-parametric equality-of-median test 
respectively. ***, **, and * report the 1%, 5%, and 10% thresholds of significance. 
  N Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Full Sample 
 
. . . . . 
Sales 432 52,680.41 6,621.47 239,639 254.26 2,786,045 
Total Assets 432 60,911.41 11,772.41 204,654 485.26 2,342,110 
Market-to-Book 429 2.10 1.69 1.449 0.37 11.85 
Debt to Assets (%) 432 37.50 36.73 14.261 5.37 75.86 
Current Ratio 432 1.50 1.25 1.098 0.21 8.45 
Ebitda-to-Total-Assets (%) 431 7.38 6.87 4.248 -6.00 22.33 
Management Stake (%) 320 5.87 0.02 13.406 0.00 69.31 
Government Stake (%) 298 18.09 5.25 19.566 0.00 87.89 
Herfindahl Ownership 432 926.54 695.68 960.048 0.00 7,724.78 
       
SOEs       
Sales 276 77,873.44*** 9,254.19*** 296833.300 256.98 2,786,045 
Total assets 276 89,064.53*** 19,380.69*** 251,576.000 1,319.70 2,342,110 
Market-to-Book 275 1.74*** 1.41*** 1.140 0.37 10.16 
Debt to Assets 276 39.34*** 39.95*** 14.643 5.37 75.63 
Current Ratio 276 1.17*** 1.11*** 0.656 0.21 4.68 
Ebitda to Assets (%) 275 7.43 6.89 4.305 -6.00 22.33 
Management Stake (%) 175 0.51*** 0*** 2.522 0.00 25.83 
Government Share (%) 142 36.68*** 36.63*** 11.737 15.66 87.89 
Herfindahl Ownership 276 836.45*** 463.45*** 1,011.515 0.00 7724.78 
Private firms       
Sales 156 8,108.13*** 3,456.25*** 15,160.570 254.26 104,962.30 
Total assets 156 11,102.04*** 6,243.09*** 16,279.410 485.26 109,911.50 
Market-to-Book 154 2.73*** 2.33*** 1.707 0.69 11.85 
Debt to Assets 156 34.23*** 31.96*** 12.975 9.90 75.86 
Current Ratio 156 2.07*** 1.64*** 1.439 0.40 8.45 
Ebitda to Assets (%) 156 7.28 6.77 4.158 -3.82 21.83 
Management Stake (%) 145 12.33*** 1.15*** 17.705 0.00 69.31 
Government Share (%) 156 1.17*** 0*** 1.870 0.00 9.78 
Herfindahl Ownership 156 1,085.94*** 920.36*** 841.182 0.00 5,386.91 
Top Shareholder (%) 145 28.86 27.22 12.517 4.14 73.38 
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Table 4 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This table presents cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over six windows around the issue announcement date 
(t=0). We give CAR values for the entire sample and then break them down into subdivisions. Significance is 
investigated with a Student t-test with the cross sectional t-statistic (𝜃𝐶𝑆) and Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen’s 
(BMP) statistic (𝜃𝐵𝑀𝑃). We use a sign test to test the significance of median and report its p-value. The last panel 
calculates the difference between SOEs and Private firms CARs. We use a t-test to assess the difference between 
mean CARs (𝜃𝐷.𝐶𝐴𝑅) and mean SCARs (𝜃𝐷.𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅) and use a nonparametric equality-of-medians test for the 
median.  ***, **, and * report the 1%, 5%, and 10% thresholds of significance. 
 
N 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   Negative CAR (%) 𝜃𝐶𝑆 T>|𝜃𝐶𝑆| 𝜃𝐵𝑀𝑃 T>|𝜃𝐵𝑀𝑃| P Sign test 
Full Sample . . . . . . . 
 [0,0] 481 0.045 55.08 0.56 0.58 0.83 0.41 0.03** 
[-1,1] 481 0.270 47.40 1.89* 0.06 2.52** 0.01 0.27 
[-2,2] 481 0.334 50.73 1.82* 0.07 2.1** 0.04 0.78 
[-1,2] 481 0.308 51.77 1.92* 0.06 2.29** 0.02 0.47 
[-2,1] 481 0.296 48.86 1.75* 0.08 2.24** 0.03 0.65 
[-5,5] 481 0.492 49.90 1.79* 0.07 2.36** 0.02 1 
SOE 
        [0,0] 319 0.077 54.63 0.79 0.43 0.89 0.38 0.11 
[-1,1] 319 0.280 45.45 1.64 0.10 2.09** 0.04 0.12 
[-2,2] 319 0.355 50.47 1.58 0.12 1.63 0.10 0.91 
[-1,2] 319 0.374 50.16 1.93* 0.05 2.04** 0.04 1 
[-2,1] 319 0.261 46.39 1.28 0.20 1.63 0.10 0.22 
[-5,5] 319 0.654 47.34 2.13** 0.03 2.45** 0.01 0.37 
Central SOE 
        [0,0] 108 0.128 50.93 0.82 0.42 1.39 0.17 0.92 
[-1,1] 108 0.610 42.59 1.96* 0.05 2.2** 0.03 0.15 
[-2,2] 108 0.642 49.07 1.74* 0.08 1.81* 0.07 0.92 
[-1,2] 108 0.736 47.22 2.23** 0.03 2.22** 0.03 0.63 
[-2,1] 108 0.516 44.44 1.48 0.14 1.79* 0.08 0.29 
[-5,5] 108 1.175 44.44 1.95* 0.05 2.2** 0.03 0.29 
Local SOE 
        [0,0] 211 0.051 56.59 0.41 0.68 0.07 0.95 0.07* 
[-1,1] 211 0.111 46.92 0.55 0.58 0.77 0.44 0.41 
[-2,2] 211 0.208 51.18 0.73 0.46 0.59 0.56 0.78 
[-1,2] 211 0.188 51.66 0.79 0.43 0.72 0.47 0.68 
[-2,1] 211 0.131 47.39 0.52 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.49 
[-5,5] 211 0.387 48.82 1.12 0.26 1.28 0.20 0.78 
Private firms 
        [0,0] 162 -0.019 55.97 -0.14 0.89 0.14 0.89 0.15 
[-1,1] 162 0.251 51.23 0.96 0.34 1.4 0.16 0.81 
[-2,2] 162 0.292 51.23 0.92 0.36 1.35 0.18 0.81 
[-1,2] 162 0.179 54.94 0.63 0.53 1.05 0.30 0.29 
[-2,1] 162 0.364 53.70 1.21 0.23 1.62 0.11 0.39 
[-5,5] 162 0.174 54.94 0.32 0.75 0.69 0.49 0.29 
         
SOE - Private firms N Diff. CARs  𝜃𝐷.𝐶𝐴𝑅 T>|𝜃𝐷.𝐶𝐴𝑅| 𝜃𝐷.𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅 T>|𝜃𝐷.𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅| P Median test 
[0,0] 481 0.096 0.56 0.57 0.46 0.65 0.46 
[-1,1] 481 0.029 0.09 0.93 0.23 0.82 0.35 
[-2,2] 481 0.063 0.16 0.87 0.00 1.00 0.97 
[-1,2] 481 0.195 0.56 0.57 0.48 0.63 0.46 
[-2,1] 481 -0.103 -0.28 0.78 -0.23 0.82 0.13 
[-5,5] 481 0.480 0.77 0.44 0.75 0.45 0.13 
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Table 5 
Local and Central SOEs 
The table presents statistics of central and local SOEs issues and issuers. The variables are the same as in tables 2 
and 3. We test the mean and median differences between central and local SOEs with a Student t-test and a non-
parametric equality-of-median test respectively. ***, **, and * report the 1%, 5%, and 10% thresholds of 
significance. 
 
 
N Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Issues 
Central SOEs       
Amount issued (M) 108 3,363.98*** 2,450*** 4,060.316 200 20,000 
Coupon 108 5.15*** 5.11*** 0.885 0 7.99 
Maturity (years) 108 5.67** 5 2.108 3.00 12.92 
Debt Payment 108 0.68 1 0.470 0 1 
Working Capital Funding 108 0.73 1 0.445 0 1 
Restrictive Covenant 94 0.74 1 0.438 0 1 
       
Local SOEs       
Amount issued (M) 211 1,217.63*** 840*** 1,212.301 90 9500 
Coupon 211 5.8*** 5.7*** 0.743 3.6 7.9 
Maturity (years) 211 5.17** 5 1.671 2 10 
Debt Payment 211 0.66 1 0.474 0 1 
Working Capital Funding 211 0.73 1 0.443 0 1 
Restrictive Covenant 183 0.8 1 0.403 0 1 
       
Panel B: Issuers 
Central SOEs       
Sales 95 195,400.1*** 47,942.92*** 485,261.3 554.22 2,786,045 
Total assets 95 211,005.1*** 62,992.38*** 401,011.7 2,823.34 2,342,110 
Market-to-Book 94 1.47*** 1.24*** 0.797 0.51 4.31 
Debt to Assets 95 39.04 39.85 16.922 5.37 75.63 
Current Ratio 95 1.08* 1.1 0.578 0.21 2.71 
Ebitda to Assets (%) 95 7.14 6.59** 4.104 -5.54 18.33 
Management Stake (%) 48 0.38 0 1.725 0.00 10.87 
Government Share (%) 36 40.79** 40.9 13.706 15.66 87.89 
Herfindahl Ownership 48 1,463.19 1,263.89 1,305.874 15.95 7,724.78 
       
Local SOEs       
Sales 181 16,188.19*** 7509.73*** 22,896.400 256.98 110,138.50 
Total assets 181 25,062.56*** 13,809.17*** 27,353.640 1319.70 166,898.00 
Market-to-Book 181 1.88*** 1.57*** 1.262 0.37 10.16 
Debt to Assets 181 39.5 39.97 13.340 7.83 71.85 
Current Ratio 181 1.23* 1.13 0.689 0.25 4.68 
Ebitda to Assets (%) 180 7.58 7.22** 4.411 -6.00 22.33 
Management Stake (%) 127 0.56 0 2.769 0.00 25.83 
Government Share (%) 106 35.29** 34.98 10.706 15.73 62.53 
Herfindahl Ownership 127 1,264.78 1,180.88 837.614 0.12 3,909.87 
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Table 6 
Regression of cumulative abnormal returns on state ownership 
The table presents the regression of CAR [-1,1] on issuance and issuer variables. Sectorial dummies and yearly 
dummies are included but not reported. Variances are clustered at the issuance level, with the t-statistic is 
reported in parentheses, and the F-statistic in brackets. ***, **, and * report the 1%, 5%, and 10% thresholds of 
significance. 
 
 
 CAR[-1,1] 
SOE  -0.0190    -0.626 
 
 (-0.05)    (-0.79) 
Central SOE   0.679*   1.189** 
 
  (1.66)   (2.22) 
Government Stake    -0.00660 0.00455 0.0119 
    (-0.65) (0.37) (0.54) 
Government Stake²     -0.000548** -0.000638*** 
     (-2.46) (-2.70) 
Private × Government Stake      -0.166 
      (-0.55) 
Private × Government Stake²      0.0280 
      (0.66) 
Amount Issued (log)  -0.157 -0.162 -0.0957 -0.0722 -0.0430 
  (-0.62) (-0.64) (-0.31) (-0.25) (-0.15) 
Maturity (log)  0.500 0.470 -0.241 -0.334 -0.353 
  (0.93) (0.89) (-0.35) (-0.48) (-0.50) 
Coupon (%)  -0.160 -0.108 -0.180 -0.173 -0.176 
  (-0.85) (-0.57) (-0.82) (-0.79) (-0.80) 
Sales (log)  -0.0204 -0.0842 -0.157 -0.169 -0.256 
 
 (-0.15) (-0.59) (-0.83) (-0.92) (-1.33) 
Market-to-Book  -0.101 -0.0962 -0.204* -0.194 -0.182 
  (-0.93) (-0.91) (-1.65) (-1.59) (-1.40) 
Ebitda-to-Assets (%)  0.0443 0.0503 0.0943* 0.0764 0.0798 
  (1.19) (1.34) (1.83) (1.52) (1.54) 
Debt-to-Assets  -0.0134 -0.0130 -0.00876 -0.0118 -0.00616 
  (-1.06) (-1.04) (-0.54) (-0.72) (-0.37) 
Current Ratio  0.0315 0.0343 0.0989 0.110 0.0699 
  (0.21) (0.24) (0.62) (0.69) (0.42) 
Constant  8.100** 8.098*** 11.28*** 11.39*** 12.10*** 
  (2.54) (2.61) (2.92) (2.96) (3.10) 
N  477 477 318 318 318 
Number of issuers (clusters)  344 344 246 246 246 
R²  0.04 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.10 
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Table 7 
Regression of cumulative abnormal returns on top shareholder 
The table presents the regression of CAR [-1,1] on ownership variables. The key variable is Top Shareholder. 
Hence, the sample only includes private firms. Sectorial dummies and yearly dummies are included but not 
reported. Variances are clustered at the issuance level, with the t-statistic is reported in parentheses, and the F-
statistic in brackets. ***, **, and * report the 1%, 5%, and 10% thresholds of significance. 
 
 
CAR[-1,1] 
Top Shareholder  -0.0813 -0.0520 0.211 
 
(-1.28) (-0.75) (1.10) 
Top Shareholder²  -0.00127 -0.00967* 
 
 (-0.72) (-1.75) 
Top Shareholder3   0.0000826 
 
  (1.62) 
Herfindahl Ownership 0.00103 0.00185 0.00157 
 
(1.08) (1.09) (0.88) 
Amount Issued (log) -0.521 -0.489 -0.523 
 (-0.90) (-0.85) (-0.92) 
Maturity (log) -0.0268 -0.0513 -0.297 
 (-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.22) 
Coupon (%) -0.218 -0.217 -0.287 
 (-0.58) (-0.59) (-0.76) 
Sales (log) 0.0751 0.0667 0.0218 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.06) 
Market-to-Book -0.0526 -0.0639 -0.0684 
 (-0.35) (-0.42) (-0.44) 
Ebitda-to-Assets (%) -0.0294 -0.0356 -0.0269 
 (-0.35) (-0.41) (-0.32) 
Debt-to-Assets -0.0319 -0.0329 -0.0339 
 (-1.31) (-1.35) (-1.40) 
Current Ratio 0.156 0.137 0.124 
 (0.86) (0.77) (0.69) 
Constant 15.05** 15.00** 14.97** 
 (2.13) (2.11) (2.12) 
N 149 149 149 
Number of issuers (clusters) 128 128 128 
R² 0.15 0.15 0.16 
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Table 8 
Regression of cumulative abnormal returns on management ownership 
The table presents the regression of CAR [-1,1] on management ownership. Sectorial dummies and yearly 
dummies are included but not reported. Variances are clustered at the issuance level, with the t-statistic is 
reported in parentheses, and the F-statistic in brackets. ***, ** and, * report the 1%, 5%, and 10% thresholds of 
significance. 
 
 
CAR[-1,1] 
Management Stake  0.0148 -0.0236 0.236** 
 
(0.75) (-0.37) (2.23) 
Management Stake²  0.000811 -0.0126*** 
 
 (0.57) (-2.88) 
Management Stake3   0.000156*** 
 
  (3.33) 
Amount Issued (log) -0.166 -0.161 -0.162 
 (-0.56) (-0.55) (-0.57) 
Maturity (log) -0.301 -0.285 -0.314 
 (-0.49) (-0.47) (-0.52) 
Coupon (%) -0.228 -0.206 -0.251 
 (-1.13) (-1.01) (-1.25) 
Sales (log) -0.0605 -0.0619 -0.0625 
 (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.37) 
Market-to-Book -0.171 -0.172 -0.188 
 (-1.39) (-1.39) (-1.52) 
Ebitda-to-Assets (%) 0.0642 0.0630 0.0775* 
 (1.42) (1.40) (1.72) 
Debt-to-Assets -0.00852 -0.00933 -0.00420 
 (-0.59) (-0.64) (-0.30) 
Current Ratio 0.0948 0.100 0.0978 
 (0.58) (0.63) (0.62) 
Constant 5.400 6.012* 5.913* 
 (1.51) (1.76) (1.73) 
N 349 349 349 
Number of issuers (clusters) 258 258 258 
R² 0.07 0.07 0.10 
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Table 9 
Spline Regression 
 
The table presents the regression of CAR [-1,1] on issuance and issuer variables. We define three variables for 
the spline regression, based on our parametric estimates. Low Insider = 12.07 if Management Stake > 12.07; Low 
Insider = Management Stake if Management Stake < 12.07; Medium Insider = 0 if Management Stake < 12.07;  
Medium Insider = (Management Stake - 12.07) if Management Stake > 12.07 & Management Stake < 41.84; 
Medium Insider = (41.84 - 12.07) if Management Stake > 41.84; High Insider = 0 if Management Stake < 41.84; 
High Insider = (Management Stake - 41.84) if Management Stake > 41.84. T-statistic is reported in parentheses. 
Sectorial dummies and yearly dummies are included but not reported. ***, **, and * report the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
thresholds of significance. 
 
 
 CAR[-1,1] 
Low Insider  0.151** 0.162** 0.128* 
  (2.24) (2.36) (1.80) 
Medium Insider  -0.110** -0.108** -0.0948** 
  (-2.37) (-2.34) (-1.99) 
High Insider  0.225*** 0.219** 0.214** 
  (2.60) (2.53) (2.44) 
Amount Issued (log)   -0.212 -0.147 
   (-0.88) (-0.48) 
Maturity (log)   -0.186 -0.356 
   (-0.28) (-0.52) 
Coupon (%)   -0.272 -0.226 
   (-1.35) (-1.05) 
Sales (log)    -0.0693 
 
   (-0.37) 
Market-to-Book    -0.181 
    (-1.28) 
Ebitda-to-Assets (%)    0.0752 
    (1.55) 
Debt-to-Assets    -0.00507 
    (-0.32) 
Current Ratio    0.0788 
    (0.43) 
N  353 353 349 
Number of issuers   261 261 258 
R²  0.08 0.09 0.09 
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Table 10 
Cumulative abnormal returns with sector indexes 
The table presents cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) over 6 windows around the announce date (t=0). The 
market model is calibrated with sector indexes. Each firm stock return is regressed on the corresponding CSI 
sector index. Sectors are matched with Morgan Stanley’s GICS classification. Significance is investigated 
through Student t-test with the cross sectional t-stat and Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen’s (BMP) statistic. We 
use a sign test to test the significance of median and report its p-value. ***, **, and * report the 1%, 5%, and 
10% thresholds of significance. 
 
 
N 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Negative CAR (%) 𝜃𝐶𝑆 T>|𝜃𝐶𝑆| 𝜃𝐵𝑀𝑃 T>|𝜃𝐵𝑀𝑃| P Sign test 
Full Sample . . . . . . . 
 [0,0] 481 0.075 53.81 0.97 0.33 1.3 0.20 0.11 
[-1,1] 481 0.299 51.56 2.16** 0.03 2.9*** 0.00 0.52 
[-2,2] 481 0.397 49.48 2.24** 0.03 2.51** 0.01 0.86 
[-1,2] 481 0.361 50.31 2.31** 0.02 2.69*** 0.01 0.93 
[-2,1] 481 0.334 50.73 2.05** 0.04 2.59*** 0.01 0.78 
[-5,5] 481 0.538 48.02 2.01** 0.05 2.57** 0.01 0.41 
SOE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
[0,0] 319 0.139 51.44 1.48 0.14 1.62 0.11 0.65 
[-1,1] 319 0.382 48.90 2.43** 0.02 2.76*** 0.01 0.74 
[-2,2] 319 0.488 47.65 2.29** 0.02 2.2** 0.03 0.43 
[-1,2] 319 0.508 47.02 2.79*** 0.01 2.67*** 0.01 0.31 
[-2,1] 319 0.363 49.53 1.9* 0.06 2.17** 0.03 0.91 
[-5,5] 319 0.795 46.39 2.68*** 0.01 2.9*** 0.00 0.22 
Central SOE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
[0,0] 108 0.202 48.15 1.4 0.16 1.88* 0.06 0.77 
[-1,1] 108 0.729 44.44 2.67*** 0.01 2.81*** 0.01 0.29 
[-2,2] 108 0.814 39.81 2.42** 0.02 2.42** 0.02 0.04** 
[-1,2] 108 0.901 43.52 3*** 0.00 2.8*** 0.01 0.21 
[-2,1] 108 0.642 46.30 2.04** 0.04 2.38** 0.02 0.5 
[-5,5] 108 1.248 42.59 2.22** 0.03 2.6** 0.01 0.15 
Local SOE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
[0,0] 211 0.106 53.17 0.88 0.38 0.63 0.53 0.4 
[-1,1] 211 0.205 51.18 1.07 0.29 1.13 0.26 0.78 
[-2,2] 211 0.321 51.66 1.18 0.24 0.82 0.41 0.68 
[-1,2] 211 0.306 48.82 1.34 0.18 1.08 0.28 0.78 
[-2,1] 211 0.220 51.18 0.92 0.36 0.8 0.42 0.78 
[-5,5] 211 0.563 48.34 1.63 0.10 1.55 0.12 0.68 
Private firms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
[0,0] 162 -0.051 58.49 -0.38 0.71 -0.12 0.90 0.04** 
[-1,1] 162 0.134 56.79 0.5 0.62 1.11 0.27 0.1* 
[-2,2] 162 0.216 53.09 0.68 0.50 1.23 0.22 0.48 
[-1,2] 162 0.072 56.79 0.24 0.81 0.85 0.40 0.1* 
[-2,1] 162 0.278 53.09 0.9 0.37 1.42 0.16 0.48 
[-5,5] 162 0.033 51.23 0.06 0.95 0.49 0.62 0.81 
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Table 11 
Regression of cumulative abnormal returns with sector indexes 
The table presents the regression of CAR[-1,1] calculated with sector indexes. Sectorial dummies and yearly 
dummies are included but not reported. Variances are clustered at the issuance level. The t-statistic is reported in 
parentheses, the F-statistic in brackets.  
 CAR[-1,1] 
Central SOE 1.236**   
 
(2.19)   
Government Stake 0.00245   
 
(0.20)   
Government Stake² -0.000582**   
 
(-2.51)   
Top Shareholder  0.158  
 
 (0.74)  
Top Shareholder2  -0.00719  
 
 (-1.18)  
Top Shareholder3  0.0000648  
 
 (1.17)  
Herfindahl Ownership  0.000934  
 
 (0.56)  
Management Stake    0.224** 
 
  (2.12) 
Management Stake²   -0.0118*** 
 
  (-2.65) 
Management Stake3   0.000147*** 
 
  (3.05) 
Amount Issued (log) -0.164 -0.596 -0.199 
 (-0.58) (-1.10) (-0.74) 
Maturity (log) -0.247 0.177 -0.217 
 (-0.35) (0.12) (-0.36) 
Coupon (%) -0.168 -0.252 -0.283 
 (-0.74) (-0.65) (-1.35) 
Sales (log) -0.166 0.174 -0.0635 
 (-0.86) (0.48) (-0.39) 
Market-to-Book -0.218* -0.162 -0.264** 
 (-1.77) (-0.93) (-2.16) 
Ebitda-to-Assets (%) 0.0776 -0.0377 0.0874* 
 (1.41) (-0.40) (1.78) 
Debt-to-Assets -0.00477 -0.0424* 0.00311 
 (-0.28) (-1.66) (0.21) 
Current Ratio 0.139 0.139 0.122 
 (0.66) (0.55) (0.59) 
Constant 11.49*** 13.62* 6.929** 
 (3.10) (1.95) (1.99) 
N 318 149 349 
Number of issuers (clusters) 246 128 258 
R² 0.09 0.16 0.10 
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Figure 1  
Marginal Effect of Management Stake 
 
The figure below draws the marginal effect of Management Stake on the predicted CAR[-1;1], based on results 
in Table 8. We display the value of the turning points (first derivative equals zero) and the local maximum and 
minimum (CAR[-1;1] equals 0). The blue area gives the 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
 
  
29.48 12.07 51.38
 
41.84
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Appendix A.1: Description of the variables 
 
The table below presents the variables. All the variables come from the Bloomberg Terminal, except for SOE, 
Central SOE, Local SOE and Private that are built using the CSI indexes classification.  
 
Variable Description 
Amount issued Bond amount issued, in million renminbi (RMB). 
Coupon Coupon of the bond, in percentage 
Current Ratio Current assets reported to current liabilities of the company. 
Debt Payment Dummy variable equals to one if the proceeds of the bonds are used for debt payment and 
zero otherwise. 
Debt to Assets Total (short-term and long-term) debt of the company on its total assets. In percentage. 
Ebitda-to-Total-
Assets 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization of the company on its total 
assets. In percentage. 
Government Stake Percentage of shares holds by the state. 
Herfindahl 
Ownership 
Sum of the squares of the percentages of shares hold by the 1st to the 20th shareholder of 
the company (from 0 to 10,000) 
Management Stake Percentage of shares holds by the management of the firm. 
Market-to-Book Stock value of the firm reported to the book value of its assets. 
Maturity Original maturity of the bond, in years. 
Restrictive 
Covenant 
Dummy variable equals to one if the issue include a covenant which limits the actions of 
the shareholders and zero otherwise. 
Sales Total value of the sales of the company, in million RMB. 
Top Shareholder Percentage of shares holds by the first shareholder of the firm. 
Total Assets Total value of the assets of the company, in million RMB. 
Working Capital 
Funding 
Dummy variable equals to one if the proceeds of the bonds are used to fund working 
capital and zero otherwise. 
SOE Dummy variable equals to one if the firm is classified as a state-owned enterprise in the 
CSI SOEs index; equals to zero otherwise. 
Central SOE Dummy variable equals to one if the firm is classified as a central state-owned enterprise 
in the CSI State-Owned index; equals to zero otherwise. 
Local SOE Dummy variable equals to one if the firm is classified as a local state-owned enterprise in 
the CSI L SOEs index; equals to zero otherwise. 
Private Dummy variable equals to one if the firm is classified as a privately-owned enterprise in 
the CSI POEs index; equals to zero otherwise. 
Low Insider Low Insider = 12.07 if Management Stake > 12.07; Low Insider = Management Stake if 
Management Stake < 12.07. 
Medium Insider Medium Insider = 0 if Management Stake < 12.07;  Medium Insider = (Management 
Stake - 12.07) if Management Stake > 12.07 & Management Stake < 41.84; Medium 
Insider = (41.84 - 12.07) if Management Stake > 41.84 
High Insider High Insider = 0 if Management Stake < 41.84; High Insider = (Management Stake - 
41.84) if Management Stake > 41.84 
 
 
 
35 
 
Appendix A.2: Correlations 
 
The table below presents the correlation across the variables employed in the analysis. 
 
 
 
  Government 
Stake 
Top 
Shareholder 
Herfindahl 
Ownership 
Management 
Stake 
Sales Market-
to-Book 
Ebitda-to-Total-
Assets 
Debt to 
Assets 
Current 
Ratio 
Amount 
issued 
Maturity 
Government 
Stake 
1           
Top Shareholder 0.02 1          
Herfindahl 
Ownership 
-0.03 0.95 1         
Management 
Stake 
-0.10 -0.01 0.03 1        
Sales  0.07 0.09 0.14 -0.09 1       
Market-to-Book 0.21 0.06 0.05 0.18 -0.17 1      
Ebitda-to-Total-
Assets 
0.07 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.36 1     
Debt to Assets -0.19 0.16 0.15 -0.19 0.21 -0.20 -0.15 1    
Current Ratio 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 0.11 -0.41 0.08 0.04 -0.44 1   
Amount issued 0.03 0.14 0.15 -0.12 0.64 -0.19 -0.05 0.26 -0.22 1  
Maturity -0.01 0.20 0.19 -0.11 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.06 0.27 1 
Coupon -0.19 -0.12 -0.15 0.02 -0.42 -0.06 -0.13 0.16 0.05 -0.34 0.07 
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